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Production factory units and their components for emergency rescue operations

Production factory units and their components for emergency rescue operations

Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. Intervention to address disasters has evolved through time into a complex policy subsystem, and disaster policy is implemented through a set of functions known as emergency management and response. Modern approaches to emergency management and response involve multidimensional efforts to reduce our vulnerability to hazards; to diminish the impact of disasters; and to prepare for, respond to, and recover from those that occur.

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Emergency management

Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. T his chapter and the preceding one use the conceptual model presented in Chapter 1 see Figure 1. As specified in that model, Chapter 3 discusses three sets of pre-disaster activities that have the potential to reduce disaster losses: hazard mitigation practices, emergency preparedness practices, and pre-disaster planning for post-disaster recovery.

This chapter focuses on National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program NEHRP contributions to social science knowledge concerning those dimensions of the model that are related to post-disaster response and recovery activities. As in Chapter 3 , discussions are organized around research findings regarding different units of analysis, including individuals, households, groups and organizations, social networks, and communities.

The chapter also highlights trends, controversies, and issues that warrant further investigation. The contents of this chapter are linked to key themes discussed elsewhere in this report, including the conceptualization and measurement of societal vulnerability and resilience, the importance of taking diversity into account in understanding both response-related activities and recovery processes and outcomes, and linkages between hazard loss reduction and sustainability.

Although this review centers primarily on research on natural disasters and to a lesser degree on technological disasters, research findings are also discussed in terms of their implications for understanding and managing emerging homeland security threats.

The discussions that follow seek to address several interrelated questions: What is currently known about post-disaster response and recovery,. What gaps exist in that knowledge? What further research—both disciplinary and interdisciplinary—is needed to fill those gaps? Emergency response encompasses a range of measures aimed at protecting life and property and coping with the social disruption that disasters produce. As noted in Chapter 3 , emergency response activities can be categorized usefully as expedient mitigation actions e.

Another common conceptual distinction in the literature on disaster response Dynes et al. Paralleling preparedness measures, disaster response activities take place at various units of analysis, from individuals and households, to organizations, communities, and intergovernmental systems.

This section does not attempt to deal exhaustively with the topic of emergency response activities, which is the most-studied of all phases of hazard and disaster management. Rather, it highlights key themes in the literature, with an emphasis on NEHRP-based findings that are especially relevant in light of newly recognized human-induced threats.

The decision processes and behaviors involved in public responses to disaster warnings are among the best-studied topics in the research literature. As noted in Chapter 3 , warning response research overlaps to some degree with more general risk communication research.

For example, both literatures emphasize the importance of considering source, message, channel, and receiver effects on the warning process. While this discussion centers mainly on responses to official warning information, it should be noted that self-protective decision-making processes are also initiated in the absence of formal warnings—for example, in response to cues that people perceive as signaling impending danger and in disasters that occur without warning.

Previous research suggests that the basic deci-. As in other areas discussed here, empirical studies on warning response and self-protective behavior in different types of disasters and emergencies have led to the development of broadly generalizable explanatory models.

According to that theory, groups faced with the potential need to act under conditions of uncertainty or potential danger engage in interaction in an attempt to develop a collective definition of the situation they face and a set of new norms that can guide their subsequent action. These collective determinations are shaped in turn by such factors as 1 the characteristics of warning recipients , including their prior experience with the hazard in question or with similar emergencies, as well as their prior preparedness efforts; 2 situational factors , including the presence of perceptual cues signaling danger; and 3 the social contexts in which decisions are made—for example, contacts among family members, coworkers, neighborhood residents, or others present in the setting, as well as the strength of preexisting social ties.

Through interaction and under the influence of these kinds of factors, individuals and groups develop new norms that serve as guidelines for action. Conceptualizing warning response as a form of collective behavior that is guided by emergent norms brings several issues to the fore.

One is that far from being automatic or governed by official orders, behavior undertaken in response to warnings is the product of interaction and deliberation among members of affected groups—activities that are typically accompanied by a search for additional confirmatory information.

Circumstances that complicate the deliberation process, such as conflicting warning information that individuals and groups may receive, difficulties in getting in touch with others whose views are considered important for the decision-making process, or disagreements among group members about any aspect of the.

Note that what is being discussed here are group-level deliberations and decisions, not individual ones. Actions under conditions of uncertainty and urgency such as those that accompany disaster warnings should not be conceptualized in individualistic terms. Another implication of the emergent norm approach to protective action decision making is the recognition that groups may collectively define an emergency situation in ways that are at variance from official views.

This is essentially what occurs in the shadow evacuation phenomenon, which has been documented in several emergency situations, including the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident Zeigler et al. While authorities may not issue a warning for a particular geographic area or group of people, or may even tell them they are safe, groups may still collectively decide that they are at risk or that the situation is fluid and confusing enough that they should take self-protective action despite official pronouncements.

The behavior of occupants of the World Trade Center during the September 11, terrorist attack illustrates the importance of collectively developed definitions. Groups of people in Tower 2 of the World Trade Center decided that they should evacuate the building after seeing and hearing about what was happening in Tower 1 and after speaking with coworkers and loved ones, even when official announcements and other building occupants indicated that they should not do so.

Others decided to remain in the tower or, perhaps more accurately, they decided to delay evacuating until receiving additional information clarifying the extent to which they were in danger. Journalistic accounts suggest that decisions were shaped in part by what people could see taking place in Tower 1, conversations with others outside the towers who had additional relevant information, and directives received from those in positions of authority in tenant firms.

In that highly confusing and time-constrained situation, emergent norms guiding the behavior of occupants of the second tower meant the difference between life and death when the second plane struck NIST, The large body of research that exists regarding decision making under threat conditions points to the need to consider a wide range of individual, group, situational, and resource-related factors that facilitate and inhibit self-protective action.

Qualitatively based decision-tree models developed by Gladwin et al. As illustrated by their work on hurricane evacuation, a number of different factors contribute to decisions on whether or not to evacuate. Such factors range from perceptions of risk and personal safety with respect to a threatened disaster, to the extent of knowledge about specific areas at risk, to constraining factors such as the presence of pets in the home that require care, lack of a suitable place to go, counterarguments by other family members, fears of looting shown by the literature to be unjustified; see, for example, Fischer, , and fear that the evacuation process may.

Warning recipients may decide that they should wait before evacuating, ultimately missing the opportunity to escape, or they may decide to shelter in-place after concluding that their homes are strong enough to resist hurricane forces despite what they are told by authorities.

In their research on Hurricane Andrew, Gladwin and Peacock describe some of the many factors that complicate the evacuation process for endangered populations :. Except under extreme circumstances, households cannot be compelled to evacuate or to remain where they are, much less to prepare themselves for the threat.

Even under extraordinary conditions many households have to be individually located and assisted or forced to comply. Segments of a population may fail to receive, ignore, or discount official requests and orders. Still others may not have the resources or wherewithal to comply. Disputes, competition, and the lack of coordination among local, state, and federal governmental agencies and between those agencies and privately controlled media can add confusion.

Businesses and governmental agencies that refuse to release their employees and suspend normal activities can add still further to the confusion and noncompliance. The normalcy bias adds other complications to the warning response process.

While popular notions of crisis response behaviors seem to assume that people react automatically to messages signaling impending danger—for example, by fleeing in panic—the reality is quite different. As noted earlier, people will not act on threat information unless they perceive a personal risk to themselves.

Simply knowing that a threat exists—even if that threat is described as imminent—is insufficient to motivate self-protective action. Nor can people be expected to act if warning-related guidance is not specific enough to provide them with a blueprint for what to do or if they do not believe they have the resources required to follow the guidance. One practical implication of research on warnings is that rather than being concerned about panicking the public with warning information, or about communicating too much information, authorities should instead be seeking better ways to penetrate the normalcy bias, persuade people that they should be concerned about an impending danger, provide directives that are detailed enough to follow during an emergency, and encourage pre-disaster response planning so that people have thought through what to do prior to being required to act.

As noted earlier, evacuation behavior has long been recognized as the reflection of social-level factors and collective deliberation. Decades ago, Drabek established that households constitute the basic deliberative units for evacuation decision making in community-wide disasters and that the decisions that are ultimately made tend to be consistent with pre-disaster household authority patterns.

For example, gender-related concerns often enter into evacuation decision making. Women tend to be more risk-averse and more inclined to want to follow evacuation orders, while males are less inclined to do so for an extensive discussion of gender differences in vulnerability, risk perception, and responses to disasters, see Fothergill, In arriving at decisions regarding evacuation, households take official orders into account, but they weigh those orders in light of their own priorities, other information sources, and their past experiences.

Information received from media sources and from family and friends, along with confirmatory data actively sought by those at risk, generally has a greater impact on evacuation decisions than information provided by public officials Dow and Cutter, , Recent research also suggests that family evacuation patterns are undergoing change. For example, even though families decide together to evacuate and wish to stay together, they increasingly tend to use more than one vehicle to evacuate—perhaps because they want to take more of their possessions with them, make sure their valuable vehicles are protected, or return to their homes at different times Dow and Cutter, Other social influences also play a role.

Neighborhood residents may be more willing to evacuate or, conversely, more inclined to delay the decision to evacuate if they see their neighbors doing so.

NEHRP-sponsored research has shown that different racial, ethnic, income, and special needs groups respond in different ways to warning information and evacuation orders, in part because of the unique characteristics of these groups, the manner in which they receive information during crises, and their varying responses to different information sources.

For example, members of some minority groups tend to have large extended families, making contacting family members and deliberating on alternative courses of action a more complicated process. Lower-income groups, inner-city residents, and elderly persons are more likely to have to rely on public transportation, rather than personal vehicles, in order to evacuate.

Lower-income and minority populations, who tend to have larger families, may. Lack of financial resources may leave less-well-off segments of the population less able to afford to take time off from work when disasters threaten, to travel long distances to avoid danger, or to pay for emergency lodging.

Socially isolated individuals, such as elderly persons living alone, may lack the social support that is required to carry out self-protective actions. Members of minority groups may find majority spokespersons and official institutions less credible and believable than members of the white majority, turning instead to other sources, such as their informal social networks.

Those who rely on non-English-speaking mass media for news may receive less complete warning information, or may receive warnings later than those who are tuned into mainstream media sources Aguirre et al.

Hurricane Katrina vividly revealed the manner in which social factors such as those discussed above influence evacuation decisions and actions. In many respects, the Katrina experience validated what social science research had already shown with respect to evacuation behavior. Those who stayed behind did so for different reasons—all of which have been discussed in past research.

Some at-risk residents lacked resources, such as automobiles and financial resources that would have enabled them to escape the city. Based on their past experiences with hurricanes like Betsey and Camille, others considered themselves not at risk and decided it was not necessary to evacuate.

Still others, particularly elderly residents, felt so attached to their homes that they refused to leave even when transportation was offered.

This is not to imply that evacuation-related problems stemmed solely from individual decisions. Katrina also revealed the crucial significance of evacuation planning, effective warnings, and government leadership in facilitating evacuations.

Planning efforts in New Orleans were rudimentary at best, clear evacuation orders were given too late, and the hurricane rendered evacuation resources useless once the city began to flood. With respect to other patterns of evacuation behavior when they do evacuate, most people prefer to stay with relatives or friends, rather than using public shelters. Shelter use is generally limited to people who feel they have no other options—for example, those who have no close friends and relatives to take them in and cannot afford the price of lodging.

Many people avoid public shelters or elect to stay in their homes because shelters do not allow pets. Following earthquakes, some victims, particularly Latinos in the United States who have experienced or learned about highly damaging earthquakes in their countries of origin, avoid indoor shelter of all types, preferring instead to sleep outdoors Tierney, ; Phillips, ; Simile, The disaster literature shows little support for the cry-wolf hypothesis.

For example, Dow and Cutter studied South Carolina residents who had been warned of impending hurricanes that ultimately struck North Carolina. However, false alarms did result in a decrease in confidence in official warning sources, as opposed to other sources of information on which people relied in making evacuation decisions—certainly not the outcome officials would have intended. Studies also suggest that it is advisable to clarify for the public why forecasts and warnings were uncertain or incorrect.

Numerous individual studies and research syntheses have contrasted commonsense ideas about how people respond during crises with empirical data on actual behavior. Among the most important myths addressed in these analyses is the notion that panic and social disorganization are common responses to imminent threats and to actual disaster events Quarantelli and Dynes, ; Johnson, ; Clarke, True panic, defined as highly individualistic flight behavior that is nonsocial in nature, undertaken without regard to social norms and relationships, is extremely rare prior to and during extreme events of all types.

Panic takes place under specific conditions that are almost never present in disaster situations. Panic only occurs when individuals feel completely isolated and when both social bonds and measures to promote safety break down to such a degree that individuals feel totally on their own in seeking safety. Panic results from a breakdown in the ongoing social order—a breakdown that Clarke describes as having moral, network, and cognitive dimensions:.

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Analysis of the factors involved in numerous fires has revealed that most deaths were not due to flame contact, but were a consequence of the production of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and other combustion products such as aldehydes, low molecular weight alcohols, hydrogen cyanide, and other noxious species. The obvious logic of this remark follows from the theory of the "fire triangle". Methods for fighting residential, shipboard, aircraft, and forest fires are researched.

Easy-to-read, question-and-answer fact sheets covering a wide range of workplace health and safety topics, from hazards to diseases to ergonomics to workplace promotion. Download the free OSH Answers app.

When business is disrupted, it can cost money. Lost revenues plus extra expenses means reduced profits. Insurance does not cover all costs and cannot replace customers that defect to the competition. A business continuity plan to continue business is essential.

Emergency Planning

Emergency management is the organization and management of the resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of emergencies preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery. The aim is to reduce the harmful effects of all hazards, including disasters. The World Health Organization defines an emergency as the state in which normal procedures are interrupted, and immediate measures need to be taken to prevent that state turning into a disaster. Thus, emergency management is crucial to avoid the disruption transforming into a disaster, which is even harder to recover from. Emergency management is a related term but should not be equated to disaster management. Emergency planning, a discipline of urban planning and design , first aims to prevent emergencies from occurring, and failing that, should develop a good action plan to mitigate the results and effects of any emergencies. As time goes on, and more data become available, usually through the study of emergencies as they occur, a plan should evolve. The development of emergency plans is a cyclical process, common to many risk management disciplines, such as business continuity and security risk management, as set out below:.

Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. T his chapter and the preceding one use the conceptual model presented in Chapter 1 see Figure 1. As specified in that model, Chapter 3 discusses three sets of pre-disaster activities that have the potential to reduce disaster losses: hazard mitigation practices, emergency preparedness practices, and pre-disaster planning for post-disaster recovery. This chapter focuses on National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program NEHRP contributions to social science knowledge concerning those dimensions of the model that are related to post-disaster response and recovery activities.

This booklet provides a generic overview of a standards-related topic. This publication does not alter or determine compliance responsibilities, which are described in the OSHA standards and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

Мы обыскали обоих. Осмотрели карманы, одежду, бумажники. Ничего похожего.

У дальней стены дрожали включенные на полную мощность динамики, и даже самые неистовые танцоры не могли подойти к ним ближе чем на десять метров. Беккер заткнул уши и оглядел толпу. Куда бы ни падал его взгляд, всюду мелькали красно-бело-синие прически.

Я не хотел, чтобы ты узнала об этом. Я был уверен, что он тебе все рассказал. Сьюзан ощутила угрызения совести. - Я тоже хватила через край. Извините.

Дэвид - это отличная кандидатура.

Он открывал секрет, открывал ключ к шифру-убийце - умоляя, чтобы люди его поняли… моля Бога, чтобы его секрет вовремя достиг агентства. - Три, - прошептала она, словно оглушенная. - Три! - раздался крик Дэвида из Испании. Но в общем хаосе их никто, похоже, не слышал. - Мы тонем! - крикнул кто-то из техников. ВР начала неистово мигать, когда ядро захлестнул черный поток.

Под потолком завыли сирены. - Информация уходит.

Emergency response operations plan Plan designed to identify the levels of response substance abuse, stress, depression, or burnout that can affect their work performance. Face piece Component of SCBA that fits over the face. fire code for the type of occupancy (such as commercial or manufacturing facilities) and.

- ТРАНСТЕКСТ вышел из строя. - Коммандер, - вмешалась Сьюзан, - я хотела бы поговорить… Стратмор жестом заставил ее замолчать. Глаза его неотрывно смотрели на Чатрукьяна. - В него попал зараженный файл, сэр. Я абсолютно в этом уверен.

- Он не очень любит Агентство национальной безопасности. - Какая редкость! - саркастически парировала Сьюзан. - Он участвовал в разработке ТРАНСТЕКСТА. Он нарушил правила.

Он обладал почти сверхъестественной способностью преодолевать моральные затруднения, с которыми нередко бывают связаны сложные решения агентства, и действовать без угрызений совести в интересах всеобщего блага.

Ни у кого не вызывало сомнений, что Стратмор любит свою страну. Он был известен среди сотрудников, он пользовался репутацией патриота и идеалиста… честного человека в мире, сотканном из лжи.

Тот протянул руку, взял Танкадо за запястье, поддерживая остававшуюся на весу руку умирающего.

У нас нет времени, чтобы… - Никакая служба здесь не появится, Сьюзан. У нас столько времени, сколько. Сьюзан отказывалась понимать. Не появится. - Но вы же позвонили… Стратмор позволил себе наконец засмеяться.

Паника заставила Сьюзан действовать. У нее резко запершило в горле, и в поисках выхода она бросилась к двери. Переступив порог, она вовремя успела ухватиться за дверную раму и лишь благодаря этому удержалась на ногах: лестница исчезла, превратившись в искореженный раскаленный металл.

Сьюзан в ужасе оглядела шифровалку, превратившуюся в море огня. Расплавленные остатки миллионов кремниевых чипов извергались из ТРАНСТЕКСТА подобно вулканической лаве, густой едкий дым поднимался кверху. Она узнала этот запах, запах плавящегося кремния, запах смертельного яда.

Очень жаль, если она истратит свой превосходный генетический заряд, произведя потомство от этого выродка, - а ведь могла бы предпочесть его, Грега. У нас были бы красивые дети, - подумал. - Чем ты занята? - спросил Хейл, пробуя иной подход. Сьюзан ничего не ответила.

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