Plant manufactory aggregates of aircraft and their engines
By embedding IoT sensors right across its product lines and manufacturing facilities, the global engineering giant has come to view data — and the services it can deliver — as a strategic asset. Is Rolls-Royce an engineering company that generates lots of data or a data-rich company that produces market-leading engines? Data generated by IoT sensors — aggregated and analyzed in the cloud — is providing Rolls-Royce with unprecedented insight into the live performance of its products — from jet engines and helicopter blades to power generation systems and marine turbines. And that data capability is rapidly evolving beyond just predicting equipment issues and maintenance requirements to providing customers with valuable aftermarket services that range from showing airlines how to optimize their routes to keeping a survey ship in position in heavy seas. A modern passenger jet such as a Boeing generates an average of GB of data per flight and several terabytes on long-haul routes.VIDEO ON THE TOPIC: Jet Engine, How it works ?
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Mostly he worried about shriveling market share driving sales and head count into the ground, the things that keep post-industrial American labor leaders up at night. On some level, though, he saw it all coming; he even demonstrated how the costs of a grounded plane would dwarf the short-term savings achieved from the latest outsourcing binge in one of his reports that no one read back in They also inherited a notoriously dysfunctional product line from the corner-cutting market gurus at McDonnell.
The premise behind this complaining was silly, Sorscher contended in PowerPoint presentations and a Harvard Business School-style case study on the topic. But when he brought that message on the road, he rarely elicited much more than an eye roll.
Occasionally, though, someone in the audience was outright mean, like the Wall Street analyst who cut him off mid-sentence:. And indeed, that would appear to be the real moral of this story: Airplane manufacturing is no different from mortgage lending or insulin distribution or make-believe blood analyzing software—another cash cow for the one percent, bound inexorably for the slaughterhouse.
In the now infamous debacle of the Boeing MAX, the company produced a plane outfitted with a half-assed bit of software programmed to override all pilot input and nosedive when a little vane on the side of the fuselage told it the nose was pitching up. The vane was also not terribly reliable , possibly due to assembly line lapses reported by a whistle-blower , and when the plane processed the bad data it received, it promptly dove into the sea.
Boeing was not, of course, a hedge fund: It was way better, a stock that had more than doubled since the Trump inauguration, outperforming the Dow in the 22 months before Lion Air plunged into the Java Sea.
Down in South Carolina, a nonunion Boeing assembly line that opened in had for years churned out scores of whistle-blower complaints and wrongful termination lawsuits packed with scenes wherein quality-control documents were regularly forged, employees who enforced standards were sabotaged, and planes were routinely delivered to airlines with loose screws, scratched windows, and random debris everywhere.
The story of the secrecy begins with the universally beloved, unusually labor-friendly, strangely not-evil Southwest Airlines. On something of a lark, Boeing had given Kelleher a sweet no-money-down deal on his first four s in , and Kelleher repaid the favor by buying more than 1, s over the next 50 years—and zero of any other plane.
Those partnerships were but one numbers-smoothing mechanism in a diversified tool kit Boeing had assembled over the previous generation for making its complex and volatile business more palatable to Wall Street, and while not entirely kosher and not at all sustainable, they were by far the least destructive tool in the kit—until Southwest called in the favor on its orders for the MAX. To whoever agreed to this, the rebate probably seemed like a predictably quixotic demand of the airline that had quixotically chosen to fly just one plane model, exclusively and eternally, where every other airline flew ten.
But the No Sim Edict would haunt the program; it basically required any change significant enough for designers to worry about to be concealed, suppressed, or relegated to a footnote that would then be redacted from the final version of the MAX.
The planes were also considerably longer, heavier, and wider of wingspan. The engines were too big to tuck into their original spot underneath the wings, so engineers mounted them slightly forward, just in front of the wings. Once the MAX materialized as a real-life plane about four years later, however, test pilots discovered new realms in which the plane was more stall-prone than its predecessors. That involved giving the system more power and removing a safeguard, but not, in any formal or genuine way, running its modifications by the FAA, which might have had reservations with two critical traits of the revamped system: Firstly, that there are two AOA sensors on a , but only one, fatefully, was programmed to trigger MCAS.
Whatever that contingency, it would have involved some kind of cockpit alert, which would in turn have required additional training—probably not level-D training, but no one wanted to risk that. So the system was programmed to turn the nose down at the feedback of a single and somewhat flimsy sensor.
And, for still unknown and truly mysterious reasons, it was programmed to nosedive again five seconds later, and again five seconds after that, over and over ad literal nauseam. And then, just for good measure, a Boeing technical pilot emailed the FAA and casually asked that the reference to the software be deleted from the pilot manual. So no more than a handful of people in the world knew MCAS even existed before it became infamous.
But the price shot right back up again on Tuesday. Preliminary satellite data showed that the plane dove just after takeoff, then recovered—and then dove again, and recovered again, and dove again, over and over. Twenty-two times the demons had violently jerked down the nose, and 22 times the pilot had corrected with equivalent force. One of the things that we do in the basic design is the pilot always has the ultimate authority of control. Pilots are familiar with this philosophy.
The Lion Air pilot was certain he could turn off whatever was trying to crash his plane, so he temporarily handed over the controls to his co-pilot and scanned the manual. Ninety seconds later, everyone was dead. As it happened, the beast would strike again, four months later, with the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight outside Addis Ababa, claiming more lives in conditions nearly identical to the Lion Air catastrophe.
The true financial cost could be much bigger for Boeing, if more carriers follow in the footsteps of Rostec, the Russian government conglomerate whose aircraft leasing arm sued Boeing in August to cancel its orders of the plane and return its deposit plus interest. The results were predictable: The engines failed their tests, often in spectacular fashion, replete with smoke and flames, over and over and over again. A shrunken staff of engineers, working overtime to implement decisions by colleagues who had long since been laid off, finally got the engines approved more than a year past their scheduled delivery dates, and malfunctions continued to plague the engines for years thereafter.
This was in no small part because Stonecipher cast himself as the savior of Boeing and knew just how to exploit a bad situation to get his way. When he arrived in Seattle, an unwieldy new computer system was conspiring with a sudden spike in orders and a clueless new workforce hired to fill them to wreak havoc on production. No one at Boeing really knew what had hit them after the McDonnell merger.
Stan Sorscher was at a family reunion when he started putting the pieces together. The last great innovation capable of driving major growth in aviation was the jet engine back in the s, and every technological advance since has been incremental.
And so the emphasis of the business is going to switch away from engineering and toward supply-chain management. Because every mature company has to isolate which parts of its business add value, and delegate the more commoditylike things to the supply chain. The more you look to the market for pricing signals, the more the role of the engineer will shrink. The new model for measuring long-term profitability in corporate America had boldly eclipsed the old Warren Buffett-style metrics like earnings and operating margins.
Theoretically, the metric can be used to make the case that a factory would be better served by shutting down and converting to condos and Amazon warehouses—or that a fighter jet factory and a fuel tanker factory would be better off consolidating production lines into one, or depending on the year that a company is in the airplane manufacturing business it can be worth more dead than alive. Pitched as a high-tech, vastly more efficient sequel to the , the plane was in every way the inverse of its predecessor.
It debuted three years behind schedule, tens of billions over budget, and was grounded 14 months after its maiden voyage, following a rash of mysterious lithium ion battery fires. This was an unintentionally funny spin on the design of the For that plane, the project managers wanted the aircraft to be as easy to assemble as Fisher-Price toys. The very first off the assembly line was airworthy. With the , very much by contrast, nothing seemed to fit.
Even the fuselage was an empty husk. Investors, voters, and regulators had all become inured to that sort of thing. That part turned out to be a lie. The plane needed to be at least feet in the air to activate the Disagree light—at which point the pilots, already preoccupied with getting the plane in the air, would only have a few seconds to turn it around.
They had the checklist! In accordance with the prescribed fix for an alert they were getting on the flight control computer, the pilots had been flying extremely fast, and above the speeds of about miles per hour at which the manual trim wheel became unbearably heavy. The Mentour Pilot had noticed the problem in his day job evaluating the final flight simulator exams of hundreds of would-be pilots.
He had even filmed a terrifying video in which he attempted to implement the MCAS override checklist in a simulator to demonstrate the system failure. The upshot was that Boeing had not only outfitted the MAX with a deadly piece of software; it had also taken the additional step of instructing pilots to respond to an erroneous activation of the software by literally attempting the impossible. Lemme was on the brink of going public with his analysis of the manual crank fail when a federal agent showed up at his door with a subpoena demanding all his electronic correspondence.
It was a sanitized but still deeply unnerving reenactment of what the Ethiopian pilots experienced. But the bigger picture was becoming clearer: Boeing had manufactured a self-hijacking plane, and in a display of grotesque cowardice, it had chosen to disseminate to pilots a checklist for counteracting the self-destruct mechanism that had killed them even faster. But as the nightmare drags on, the clarity of things has dimmed a bit. We have learned that there were other problems with the MAX—esoteric and exponentially less comprehensible than the MCAS nosedives—as well as problems that dated back to earlier generations of corner-cutting , but troubles that the company and the agency are genuinely trying to fix.
The FAA is not mandating repairs to the cables. We have learned as well that Patrick Shanahan, the former Boeing executive and acting defense secretary whom President Trump nominated and then withdrew from consideration for the job, was accused of hitting his then-wife in But, as it generally goes when a corporate malefactor is caught doing something wrong, we have also unlearned some things about Boeing and the MAX.
Starting almost immediately after the Ethiopian crash, Daniel Elwell and Sam Graves, respectively the then-acting FAA chief and the ranking Republican on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, led a coordinated campaign to blame the dead pilots for crashing the planes. The crux of their argument was that there was nothing to see here—that correct execution of the runaway stabilizer checklist would have saved all lives, and that the real scandal behind the two crashes was a regime of lax foreign pilot training standards.
Graves proceeded, in the storied tradition of congressional grandstanding, to call for the Department of Transportation to launch an investigation into this manifest nonissue. What had been a tidy fable about good and greed, up there with OxyContin and the Ford Pinto, one of the simplest ever told about the perils of following orders from investor-managers, was gradually dissolving into incoherence and uncertainty.
We need to concentrate on the pilot The House Aviation Subcommittee held regular hearings. Captain Carey, you made more than a few headlines by releasing portions of an apparently secret recording made in November Who made that recording, sir?
Did the APA board of directors authorize that or know in advance you were making the recording? Explain to me what warranted that, sir! Boeing had a history of deflecting blame on to dead pilots, even back in the pre-Stonecipher era, when a malfunctioning rudder on an earlier generation of s caused a string of crashes and near-misses in the s, while Boeing and its surrogates promulgated a range of alternative theories about pilots inexplicably or intentionally jamming the controls.
Carey could feel the MCAS story veering into similar territory, so he recorded the meeting in case another once-in-a-lifetime MCAS fail occurred—as it indeed did. Men like these had told far bigger lies for far bigger and scarier clients to far more destructive ends. And far more successfully: Regardless of what happens in the criminal case, there have been more than 60 lawsuits filed against Boeing over the MAX.
No one who knows anything about anything believes Boeing is anywhere close to being out of the woods, and some who know a lot think the road ahead could lead to bankruptcy court. It hardly mattered. The hunter killer assassins will destroy the Boy Scouts. None of these things had to be ideological wars, said Cole, a lifelong conservative who now chairs the King County Republican Party in Washington state and first joined the union—membership in SPEEA had been voluntary when she joined—because not a few months into her first engineering job she had watched a space shuttle land in a control room full of engineers who had built the shuttle.
This happens in the movies. The family had been spread across Bermuda, where Paul worked as an investment manager at Butterfield Bank, and Ontario, where his wife and children were settling down. Paul was expected to join them later. The distance had been hell, and he had never even had a girlfriend before her; his family was literally everything, he explained, and every single one of them was gone. It is difficult for me to think of anything but the horror they must have felt. After his testimony, a dead-eyed Njoroge stood in the hallway for nearly three hours, granting interviews to the dozens of journalists who needed exclusive footage to anchor their packages.
By Maureen Tkacik. An investigator with the U. Sign Up.
GE Aircraft Engines
Over the past decade, aero engine manufacturing processes have increased in complexity to meet advanced design requirements and evolving customer demands. Engine configurations today must reach peak performance standards while maintaining controlled maintenance costs. Low noise and emissions coupled with high fuel efficiency, are the key parameters to meet aero engine design requirements. Cyient supports turbine engine OEMs in deploying innovative technology solutions for aircraft engine components and modules. Our expertise lies in the design and ownership of actions, bearings, rotors, cases, lube systems, dynamic loads, and electric propulsion systems for aircraft.
Rolls-Royce is using Microsoft Azure IoT to target use cases in predictive maintenance and fuel efficiency. Maintaining the aircraft on the ground can add hundreds of dollars per hour. Although fuel costs have been falling, airlines are still pursuing ways to reduce running expenses. Some areas being pursued include increasing fuel efficiency of jet engines, optimizing flight paths, and improving maintenance.
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Based in Baltimore, Maryland, USA with approximately employees, MRAS has two principal business lines: 1 design, development, production and sale of nacelles, thrust reversers and aerostructures, and 2 spare parts sales. ST Engineering has been looking to invest in new growth areas, including businesses that offer competitive products through the ownership of intellectual properties and that are synergistic to its core businesses. MRAS is a strong fit given its expertise and proprietary designs to manufacture nacelles using advanced composites. The Proposed Acquisition will allow ST Engineering to scale up its aerospace capabilities by moving the company into the OEM business of high-value nacelle components and replacement parts. MRAS has a good combination of mature and next-generation nacelle programmes, all of which are single-source contracts. There are more than 6, Aneo aircraft ordered to-date. The Proposed Acquisition is expected to be earnings accretive for the Group and its Aerospace sector. With the production rate for the Aneo reported to increase from the current 55 to 63 units per month by mid, the production ramp-up is expected to improve productivity and drive future revenue and earnings growth for MRAS. We are excited by the prospects of our investment in MRAS, which is a high-value and complementary business that will enhance our scale, global reach and capture synergies for the Group. I am confident that ST Engineering is the right choice for the future.
How Rolls-Royce Maintains Jet Engines With the IoT
Mumbai, India - When a commercial pilot in India announced in that he would build a plane on top of the roof of his home, most people thought he was joking because he had no aeronautical engineering experience. Yadav, who works as a senior commander with Jet Airways and flies twin-engine turboprop planes, said it was his longtime dream to build aircraft. Despite the fact his family's construction business was running a significant loss that year, they decided to fund his "dream" project. His mother used her Mangala Sutra necklace as collateral for a loan from a local jeweller.
Handley Page Limited was a British aerospace manufacturer. Founded by Frederick Handley Page later Sir Frederick in , it was the United Kingdom's first publicly traded aircraft manufacturing company. It went into voluntary liquidation and ceased to exist in
The holding company operates in the area of development, production and after sale maintenance of aircraft systems and units. Prior to creating Aircraft Equipment Group, each company was guided by its own development strategy which hindered the development of the sector. By bringing together domestic device-building companies in one holding company, Russian Technologies launched an innovative policy of the sector development.
Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. Consideration of aircraft operations, including inspection, maintenance, and repair procedures is crucial in the development and application of new materials and structures. This part of the committee's report focuses on the operation and monitoring of materials and structures in a service environment. Chapter 7 , "Aircraft Maintenance and Repair," describes the issues related to maintenance of commercial transport aircraft. The lessons learned from the aging of metal and composite structure are discussed.
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Mostly he worried about shriveling market share driving sales and head count into the ground, the things that keep post-industrial American labor leaders up at night. On some level, though, he saw it all coming; he even demonstrated how the costs of a grounded plane would dwarf the short-term savings achieved from the latest outsourcing binge in one of his reports that no one read back in They also inherited a notoriously dysfunctional product line from the corner-cutting market gurus at McDonnell. The premise behind this complaining was silly, Sorscher contended in PowerPoint presentations and a Harvard Business School-style case study on the topic. But when he brought that message on the road, he rarely elicited much more than an eye roll. Occasionally, though, someone in the audience was outright mean, like the Wall Street analyst who cut him off mid-sentence:. And indeed, that would appear to be the real moral of this story: Airplane manufacturing is no different from mortgage lending or insulin distribution or make-believe blood analyzing software—another cash cow for the one percent, bound inexorably for the slaughterhouse. In the now infamous debacle of the Boeing MAX, the company produced a plane outfitted with a half-assed bit of software programmed to override all pilot input and nosedive when a little vane on the side of the fuselage told it the nose was pitching up.
With a majority stake belonging to the Russian Government , it consolidates Russian private and state-owned aircraft manufacturing companies and assets engaged in the manufacture, design and sale of military, civilian, transport, and unmanned aircraft. Many of the corporation's assets are located in various regions in Russia, with joint-ventures with foreign partners in Italy, India and China. After the Soviet Union's sudden collapse in , the aerospace industry of Russia was in turmoil.
An engine is the heart of a vehicle's operating system and ultimately what makes the vehicle a successful form of transportation. Without the engine, a vehicle is just another big piece of stamped out metal appearing in various shapes and sizes. In addition to being manufactured for vehicles, engines are also built for aircraft and large machinery equipment, such as Caterpillar excavators and dozers. They are also used in trailer manufacturing for the hydraulic systems.
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